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THE RELEVANCE OF OPTION VALUE IN BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 
Stephen 0. Reiling and Mark W. Anderson* 
INTRODUCTION 
Option value has been the subject of considerable debate in the 
economic literature since it was first introduced by Weisbrod [1964]. 
This debate is of importance because of its implications to public 
investment decision criteria, particularly when they are applied to the 
trade-off between the preservation and development of a natural 
resource or area. These decisions often produce heated public 
discussion, such as those surrounding the Tellico Dam snail darter 
controversy and the construction of a hydroelectric dam in the Hell's 
Canyon. 
It has been argued that option value should be included in benefit/ 
cost calculations to measure the "true" costs of development. That is, 
option value should be an addition to the negative benefits associated 
with development or, conversely, a positive addition to preservation 
benefits. Inclusion of option value in benefit/cost calculations would 
result in more conservative investment decisions by reducing the 
benefit/cost ratio of many development projects. Hence, it provides a 
theoretical justification for arguing against many development projects 
on the grounds of economic efficiency, which is the cornerstone of 
public investment criteria. 
While the conceptual importance of option value seemed clear to the 
early writers on the subject, operationalization of the concept through 
measurement has never occurred. Measurement has only been addressed at 
a theoretical level. The central issue revolves around the difference 
between option value and expected consumer's surplus. At least one 
writer argued that the two concepts were one and the same, while others 
have "shown" that option value is greater than or less than expected 
consumer's surplus. All in all, this debate has raised questions about 
the validity and importance of \he concept. Some writers have abandoned 
it while others have continued to defend it. 
•Assistant Professor and Research Associate, respectively, Department of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Maine at Orono. 
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We have two objectives in this report. The first is to review the 
concept of option value and determine the conditions that are necessary 
for its existence. This is a necessary prerequisite to the second 
objective, which is to examine the literature related to its measurement 
and draw conclusions about the importance and relevance of the concept. 
In essence, this publication represents a review and a critical 
re-evaluation of the literature dealing with option value. This 
literature is rich and dynamic, and provides a fascinating sequence of 
articles, comments, and rebuttals. Re-evaluation of the concept 
requires a rather comprehensive review of this literature, which is 
something that has not been provided to date. The literature review is 
also important because the work of some authors has been systematically 
overlooked in the course of the debate. As a result of this oversight, 
the original formulation of the concept continues to be cited in the 
literature [see, for example, Freeman 1979] even though its practical 
significance is doubtful. Considerable confusion has also arisen 
between option value and the newer concept of an "irreversibility effect" 
(see below). This "irreversibility effect" has been called quasi-option 
value and even the "true option value." The discussion in this paper is 
limited to Weisbrod's original concept as it evolved, which we feel 
should be termed option value. Other distinct concepts should be given 
different names in order to prevent confusion. 
THE NATURE OF OPTION VALUE 
The initial formulation of option value was developed by Weisbrod 
[1964] in the form of "option demand." He observed that individual 
consumption goods may possess public good attributes. The public good 
characteristic stems from the existence of "option demand" or the 
willingness of rational "economic men" to pay for the option of 
consuming the good or service at some time in the future. 
The concept can be best illustrated with an example. To follow 
Weisbrod, we can envisage a privately owned park encompassing a unique 
resource (such as Sequoia National Park) and the owner exercises perfect 
price discrimination. In addition, there are no externalities that 
distort the allocative decision. Under these conditions, if revenues 
collected by a perfectly discriminating monopolist fall short of costs, 
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"... allocative efficiency considerations would indicate "closing" the 
park, assuming that private and social rates of discount are equal" 
[Weisbrod 1964, p. 472]. However, Weisbrod argued that because the 
owner is unable to charge potential users who value the option to use 
the park in the future, this private decision may be inefficient from 
society's perspective. There are, in essence, external economies of 
current production that result in the free rider effect commonly 
associated with collective goods. "In the interests of economic 
efficiency, it would be desirable to keep the firm in business if the 
total of fees potentially collectable from current consumers and fees 
potentially collectable from prospective future consumers -- including 
those who, in fact, will not become consumers — are adequate to cover 
costs" [Weisbrod 1964, p. 473]. 
Whenever the firm's expected revenue (exclusive of option revenue) 
exceeds expected costs, the option demand of people who may use the park 
in the future is always satisfied. That is, provision of the good or 
service satisfies the public good aspect reflected by option demand. 
Since part of the firm's output has public good characteristics, a 
public subsidy may be justified on efficiency grounds when one considers 
the willingness to pay of consumers who may never visit the site but who 
still value the option to visit in the future. Subsidization is 
obviously only necessary in the case of the "sub-marginal" producer 
whose expected revenue from actual visitors does not cover costs. If 
revenues plus the willingness to pay for the option are less than costs, 
a subsidy would not be justified and efficiency criteria would indicate 
that the firm should shut down. 
Weisbrod indicated that option demand exists for all goods. How-
ever, he set forth two conditions that must exist for option demand to 
be "significant." These are: 1) infrequency and uncertainty of 
purchase, and 2) very high costs of increasing production once it has 
been curtailed.— Weisbrod argued that frequently-purchased goods (and 
hence a high degree of certainty associated with their purchase) for 
-Actually, a third condition is that the good or service in question is 
nonstorable. That is, it is not possible to purchase the commodity 
now and store it for later consumption [Weisbrod 1964, p. 472]. 
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which output expansion is less costly will have insignificant option 
value. So the difference between private goods with significant option 
demand and those without is a matter of degree, not of kind. 
Weisbrod's original exposition did not explicitly focus on its 
impact on public investment criteria. Instead, it illustrated the 
potential existence of option demand for all private (market and non-
market) goods. However, its implications for public resource develop-
ment projects are obvious. If a development project under consideration 
results in the destruction of a natural environment, the potential 
revenue or value of that environment to current users would under-
estimate the "true" value. The potential revenue that non-users would 
be willing to pay to retain the option to use the area in the future 
should be included to reflect the "true" value of the natural environ-
ment. Krutilla [1967] was one of the first writers to illustrate this 
point. 
The notion that option value may exist for all goods could be 
important in attempts to operationalize the concept of option value for 
use in public investment decisions. The decision concerning which 
benefits are lost or gained in terms of option value would require a 
determination of whether the purchase (or use) of the commodity (or 
resource) was infrequent enough and its output expansion costly enough 
to warrant the addition of an option value to the calculation. Recogni-
zing that an option demand exists for all commodities, the chore becomes 
one of determining whether this demand is of significant value. 
The existence of option value for all goods and services raises 
another question relative to benefit/cost analysis not generally 
confronted in the literature. If there is an option value attached to 
natural resources destroyed by a project, is there not also an option 
value attached to the output of that project? Again, the problem 
becomes one of determining whether this value is significant. 
The first reaction to Weisbrod's formulation of option demand came 
from Long [1967]. His comment focused on two issues: 1) the conditions 
required for option value to exist, and 2) the relationship between 
option value and consumer's surplus. With regard to the first, he 
suggests that infrequency of purchase is irrelevant and that indivisi-
bility and heterogeneity of the commodity or resource are the conditions 
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that produce option demand. "If the product is divisible and sold under 
competitive conditions, the market will give the right allocation with-
out any government subsidy for option value ... Option value ... is 
only of importance for ... a commodity for which there is no good 
substitute" [Long 1967, p. 352]. Hence, uniqueness of the product or 
resource is a necessary condition for Long's interpretation of option 
demand. 
Examination of the examples used by Weisbrod to illustrate the 
nature of option value suggests that he implicitly acknowledged the 
importance of uniqueness as a condition for option demand to be 
significant. For example, the park example discussed above explicitly 
assumed that the park contained a unique resource large Sequoia trees. 
His other examples, hospitals and urban transit systems, both imply a 
substantial degree of uniqueness. In fact, there may not be any 
substitutes available for the services provided by either of these 
facilities in many communities. Hence, it seems that uniqueness is an 
important condition for the presence of a significant option demand. 
That is, option value is positively related to the level of uniqueness 
of the product or resource. In terms of resource development projects, 
unique natural resource environments that would be destroyed by 
development would have a high option value whereas non-unique environ-
ments would not. Likewise, project outputs would produce significant 
option demand only if they are unique. 
Long also disagreed with Weisbrod's other necessary condition for 
option value: "Weisbrod's conditions on costs (of increasing 
production once it has been curtailed) has nothing to do with the 
problem; it simply says that it is important to make correct decisions 
when the costs of reversing wrong ones are large" [Long 1967, p. 352]. 
Therefore, uniqueness (and, presumably, non-storability) are the only 
conditions necessary for the existence of option value according to 
Long. 
Long also addressed the distinction between option value and 
consumer's surplus. Weisbrod's analysis indicated that option value was 
an additional value that was separate and distinct from consumer's 
surplus. For example, option value was separate from and in addition 
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to the potential revenue that could be collected from users by a 
perfectly discriminating monopolist. The latter revenue, by definition, 
captures all consumer's surplus. But it fails to capture the revenue 
that potential users would pay for options to consume the product in 
the future, i.e., the option value. 
Long [1967, p. 351] challenged this contention and argued that 
"option value is the unrecognized son of that old goat, consumer's 
surplus." Hence, "option value must be used in place of and not in 
addition to ... consumer's surplus" 
Although Weisbrod did not respond to Long's comments, Lindsay 
[1964] defended Weisbrod's position on this latter point. Lindsay 
reemphasized the condition of uncertainty and compared option value to 
an insurance premium. "In the case of option demand, what is desired 
to be purchased is relief from the uncertainty that capacity or stocks 
will be insufficient to satisfy a later demand" [Lindsay 1967, p. 345]. 
He concludes that option value is different than consumer's surplus 
since the former exists for goods consumed in the uncertain future and 
the latter pertains to the certain present. The implicit conclusion is 
that option value is separate from, and in addition to, consumer's 
surplus. 
Lindsay's reference to uncertainty is somewhat different than 
Weisbrod's in that Lindsay emphasizes uncertainty of future supply while 
Weisbrod emphasizes uncertainty of future demand or purchase. We 
believe this distinction is important and view uncertainty of purchase 
as the critical condition for the existence of option value. If an 
individual knows for certain that he will not demand the good in the 
future, he would not be willing to pay anything for the option, 
II 
regardless of the degree of supply uncertainty.— In addition, if a 
person knows that he will demand the good in the future, the appropriate 
measure of his potential loss due to supply uncertainty is the reduction 
— That person may have an "existence demand," however. Existence demand 
represents the value of the good to a person even though he or she will 
never purchase it. It represents the increase in utility that people 
receive from knowing that something exists even though they never will 
consume the good. Existence demand is distinct from option demand. 
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in his expected consumer's surplus. Therefore, we believe that 
uncertainty of purchase rather than uncertainty of supply is a critical 
condition for the presence of option value. 
Although supply uncertainty is neither a necessary nor sufficient 
condition for option value, it seems to be related to the concept in two 
ways. First, a high level of supply uncertainty may induce potential 
users to accurately articulate their option value and contribute 
revenue in the hope of insuring future provision of the good. That is, 
a high degree of supply uncertainty would jeopardize their free rider 
position. On the other hand, one would hypothesize that potential users 
would discount their value of the option in proportion to the level of 
supply uncertainty. The degree to which potential users believe that 
the sum of revenue raised from the sale of options would not be 
sufficient to guarantee future provision would influence their value of 
the option. This suggests that supply uncertainty may influence the 
magnitude of option value as well as the willingness of potential users 
to articulate their option value. But it is not a necessary condition 
for the existence of option value. 
A summary of the above discussion may be useful. Option demand 
(or value) can be defined as the amount a consumer who is not currently 
consuming the good would be willing to pay to retain the option to 
purchase the good at the prevailing price at some time in the future. 
Whether or not the consumer ever exercises the option is irrelevant so 
long as he is willing to pay a positive sum of money for the option. 
We believe that four conditions must exist for option demand to be 
significant: 1) uncertainty of purchase, 2) nonstorability of the 
good, 3) a unique quality of the good (no good substitutes exist), and 
4) the cost of increasing (recommencing) production once it has been 
curtailed (stopped) is extremely high. 
With regard to the last condition, we support Weisbrod rather than 
Long. If this condition did not exist, occasional demanders of the 
product could be accommodated without extreme difficulty and there would 
be no need for potential users to purchase an option. We also disagree 
with Long's contention that option value is nothing more than expected 
consumer's surplus. Under conditions of demand certainty, option value 
and expected consumer's surplus are identical. But this ignores the 
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basic premise of demand uncertainty that underlies the concept of option 
value. We do believe, however, that a relationship exists between 
option value and expected consumer's surplus. This will be discussed 
in detail in the next section. 
THE MEASUREMENT OF OPTION VALUE 
The exchange between Long and Lindsay set the stage for the 
subsequent debate about the relationship between option value and 
consumer's surplus. Some writers argued that option value was separate 
and in addition to consumer's surplus, while others contended that the 
concepts were the same. Different authors adopted different 
conceptual frameworks to "prove" their point. The most striking change 
in the debate is that subsequent writers presented more formal and more 
rigorous tools to analyze the issue. 
Byerlee's Utility Function Approach 
Byerlee [1971] was the first to formalize the discussion by 
introducing a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function framework. This 
formalized the uncertainty of future purchase aspects of option value 
emphasized by Lindsay and Weisbrod. Byerlee assumed that the purchase 
of an option assures future availability of the good to the owner of the 
option while non-purchase precludes future consumption. We will briefly 
summarize Byerlee's analysis and then raise a question regarding the 
appropriateness of the formulation. 
Byerlee presents the following pay-off matrix for the purchase of 
an option for good X with the consumer's income, Y. The quantity of X 
and Y are measured relative to the consumer's present position and -y 
represents the income given up to purchase the option. 
Desires to Does Not Desire to 
Purchase X Purchase X 
(SjJ (S2) 
P^) P (1-P) 
Purchase Option (Aj) (X, y) (0, y) 
Does Not Purchase Option (A-) (0, 0) (0, 0) 
The option value problem can be stated in terms of the pay-off 
matrix: "find the maximum amount (of income), yd, that the decision 
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maker would pay for the option of consuming X. That is, we require the 
value of y that makes the decision maker indifferent between alterna-
tives A, and A„" [Byerlee 1971, p. 524]. In other words, we want to 
solve for the variable yd such that the utility associated with 
alternatives A. and A- are equal: 
(1) U (Aj) U (A2) 
where U (A.) P U (X, yd) + (1 p) U (0, V 
and U (A2) = p U (0 , 0) + (1 p) U (0 , 0) 
Byerlee then defines the utility of the consumer's present 
position to be zero. That is: U (0, 0) 0. This provides the 
reference point for comparing other situations with the present 
position in the von Neumann-Morgenstern framework. This allows us to 
rewrite equation (1) as: 
P U (X, yd) + (1 p) U (0, yd) = 0 (2) 
Two conclusions can be drawn from equation (2). First, by assuming 
that (a) the only price the consumer has to pay to consume the good is 
the price of the option, and (b) the consumer is certain that he will 
consume the good in the future (p 1), equation (2) reduces to: 
U (X, yd) 0 (3) 
But, by definition, the consumer's surplus (y ) is equal to: 
U (X, yc) 0 (4) 
Therefore, y. y . That is, under conditions of certainty of 
future purchase, option value and consumer's surplus are identical. 
Second, if we assume that the decision maker must pay a price of 
y to purchase good X under conditions of uncertainty, equation (2) 
becomes: , , 
P U (X, y c yd) + (1 p) U (0, yd) 0 (5) 
Since U (X, y c) 0, clearly yd 0. "That is, for a perfectly 
discriminating monopolist charging a price that extracts all consumer's 
surplus, option demand is zero" [Byerlee 1971, p. 525]. This result 
contradicts the conclusion of Weisbrod and others that option demand was 
in addition to the revenue that could be collected by a perfectly 
3/ discriminating monopolist.-' 
3/we challenge Byerlee's conclusion below. 
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Byerlee [1971, pp. 526-527] also draws other conclusions about the 
relationships between expected consumer's surplus and option value. 
These relationships vary with changes in degree of risk aversion adopted 
by the consumer and the shape (marginal rate of substitution) of the 
consumer's indifference curve for income and good X. He concludes that 
risk averse individuals would "discount uncertain gains and pay less 
than the expected consumer surplus, and not something additional as 
Lindsay claims." He also suggests that expected consumer's surplus and 
option demand should be dropped from the economists' vocabulary and be 
replaced with a broader definition of consumer's surplus: the amount 
of "money a consumer would pay for the right to buy at the current 
price something that he is now buying or may buy in the future." 
Clearly, Byerlee's article focuses on the nature of the measurement 
problem associated with option demand. His results contradict those of 
earlier writers, especially Weisbrod and Lindsay who argue that option 
value is in addition to the revenue received by a perfectly discriminat-
ing monopolist. Although Byerlee's formulation has not been criticized 
in the literature, we do not believe his approach "proves" that option 
value is zero when a person pays a price for the good that is equal to 
his consumer's surplus. 
Our challenge stems from the utilities assigned to the cells of the 
pay-off matrix; specifically, we disagree with the utility assigned to 
the A- Sj cell of the matrix. Byerlee contends that if a person does 
not purchase an option but later desires to purchase the good, the 
individual suffers no utility loss. That is, his level of utility is 
the same as it was at the time he was faced with the decision of whether 
or not to purchase the option. In effect, this removes all the 
incentive the individual would have to purchase the option. We question 
the validity of this reasoning. It seems to us that the individual 
would suffer a utility loss (relative to the level at the time the 
decision on the option is made) if he chooses to not purchase the 
option but then decides at a future time he would like to purchase the 
good. That is, the level of utility associated with the A ? S1 cell 
should be less than utility associated with the A„ S„ cell. In the 
former case the consumer would like to purchase the good and in the 
latter he does not want to purchase the good. We are, however, uncertain 
10 
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about the appropriate measure of the magnitude of this loss. Perhaps 
it should be equal to the expected value of the consumer's surplus 
E(yc). 
If our criticism is correct, it has significant implications 
regarding the conclusions of Byerlee. For example, U (A„) would not be 
equal to zero; and, the right hand side of Equation (2) would not be 
equal to zero. Therefore, one could not conclude that option value was 
equal to consumer's surplus under conditions of certainty or that option 
value is equal to zero when the good is sold by a perfectly 
discriminating monopolist. 
The latter point is important since Byerlee contradicts Weisbrod. 
We believe that if the A„ S. cell of the matrix accurately reflected 
the utility loss the individual would suffer in that situation, it would 
be possible for option value to exist over and above the revenue of the 
discriminating monopolist. Even a perfectly discriminating monopolist 
can only collect revenue from those who actually purchase the good. 
Potential users who desire to hedge against the possible utility loss 
associated with not being allowed to consume the good in the future may 
pay a positive sum for the option. This revenue would be in addition 
to the perfectly discriminating revenue received from current users. 
Hence, we do not believe Byerlee has adequately demonstrated that 
Weisbrod erred in his original argument that option value is an addition 
to consumer's surplus in the presence of uncertainty of demand. 
Positive Option Value: Circchetti and Freeman Proof 
Cicchetti and Freeman [1971] were next to address the relationship 
4/ between option value and expected consumer's surplus.- We believe that 
our criticism of Byerlee's formulation was recognized by Cicchetti and 
Freeman [1971, p. 529] and that it provided a major motivation for their 
response: 
-This article is a condensation of a more complete treatment of the 
subject by Krutilla, Cicchetti, Freeman, and Russell (Krutilla, et al., 
1972). However, we will follow the convention in the literature, 
particularly that from RFF, and consider the Cicchetti and Freeman 
article as the primary reference. The major difference between the 
two is that the more comprehensive article presents the proof in terms 
of compensating and equivalent measures, whereas the shorter one 
presents only the compensating variation argument. This made no 
difference in the authors' conclusions. 
11 
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"[Byerlee] concludes that expected consumer's surplus could exceed 
the maximum option price a risk averter would pay, i.e., that pure 
option value could be negative. His model includes the loss that 
an individual would experience if he purchased the option but did 
not exercise it ... However, a second kind of loss is also 
relevant, the loss associated with not purchasing the option and 
later demanding the good but finding it not to be available. 
This is a reflection of supply uncertainty as well"— (emphasis 
added). 
Hence, they also question Byerlee's contention that there is no loss in 
utility if a person does not purchase the option, but later demands the 
good and is not allowed to purchase it. 
Given this background, Cicchetti and Freeman [1971, p. 530] state 
their objective unambiguously: 
"We will show that where there is uncertainty and individuals are 
risk averse, a perfectly discriminating monopolist who can exclude 
those who do not pay the option in advance will maximize the 
present value of his stream of revenues by selling options to 
purchase the good in the future at specified price, and that these 
revenues will be greater than the present value of the expected 
consumer surpluses. The difference is option value."—' 
Cicchetti and Freeman adopt a framework in which the selling 
monopolist has a two-part pricing scheme. In the first part the 
- W e prefer to refer to this as access uncertainty rather than supply 
uncertainty. Option value can exist even in the case of certainty of 
future supply (or availability) if only those persons who purchase the 
option have the right to access or consumption. 
-'Note that, for option value to be positive, the "specified price" at 
which the good is sold to option holders is not the perfectly 
discriminating price. If an individual knew that the price charged to 
consume the good in the future would extract his entire consumer's 
surplus, the option to retain (or obtain) the right to purchase the 
good would have zero value. This point was illustrated by Zeckhauser 
[1969]. 
12 -
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monopolist sells options for future use and charges each purchaser the 
maximum he is willing to pay for the option. In the second part, the 
monopolist charges a predetermined price when option holders desire 
access to the good. The question to be addressed is whether the 
maximum price the consumer will pay for the option (OP) is ever greater 
than the expected value of his consumer's surplus, E(CS). This 
difference, if any, is defined as option value (OV): 
OV OP E(CS) (6) 
In terms of equation (6), Cicchetti and Freeman "show" that option 
value is positive; that is, the price a consumer will pay for the option 
is greater than the expected value of his consumer's surplus, given 
uncertainty of future demand and high risk averse behavior by the 
consumer. 
They begin their analysis by looking at the special case of 
certainty of future demand, i.e., the probability of future demand, 
P (d), is equal to one. They resurrect Byerlee's conclusion by showing 
that option price is equal to consumer's surplus under this special 
condition. That is: 
OP = E(CS) = CS 
when P(d) 1 
Therefore: 
OV 0 
This confirms Weisbrod's original contention that uncertainty of future 
demand is a necessary condition for the existence of option value. 
The second, and major part of their analysis is less straight-for-
ward and less convincing. Figure 1 presents a three-move, eight-outcome 
game tree that Cicchetti and Freeman use to accommodate both access and 
demand uncertainty in their model. The utilities associated with each 
of these outcomes can be ranked, as long as we confine ourselves to 
assuming that the consumer either demands or does not demand the good 
in the future. Table 1 shows what these two rankings would be. The 
logic behind these rankings should be clear. For example, U, is the 
utility associated with the free rider phenomenon. Here the consumer 
does not buy the option, demands the good, and has it supplied. 
Cicchetti and Freeman assume this outcome has a probability of zero (0), 
13 
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Demands Does Not Demands 
Demand 
Buys Option Does Not Buy Option 
Does Not 
Demand 
Supplied Not Supplied N < " Supplied Not Supplied Not 
Supplied Supplied Supplied Supplied 
TABLE 1. Rankings of Uti 
Associated with 
Tree Outcomes 
lities 
Game 
Consumer Demands 
Rank Utility 
1 
2 
3 
4 
U5 
Ul 
U6 
u2 
Consumer Does Not Demand 
Rank Utility 
1 
2 
U 7 U 8 * 
3 
4 
U 3 U 4 * 
•Assumes the future is compressed 
into a single time period. 
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as does the converse outcome, U„, where the consumer purchases the 
option, demands the good and the good is not supplied. They go on to 
present two indifference mappings to represent the utilities associated 
with these outcomes. Only one of the two mappings will exist for each 
consumer depending on whether or not he demands the good. They then 
devise a method to make the two indifference mappings commensurable: 
"For any level of disposable income (e.g., Y ), if the individual 
did not demand the good he would choose a consumption point on the 
Y axis and experience a certain level of utility (e.g., Ug); if he 
were to demand the good (assuming that is available [to the 
individual]), he would choose a tangency point on the budget line 
associated with that point, and experience a given level of 
utility (e.g., U 5 ) . We assume that the alternative outcomes have 
the same utility. Thus, Ufi U,-" [Cicchetti and Freeman, p. 534; 
emphasis added]. 
We believe that the stated assumption requires the reader to make a 
giant leap of faith. Although there is nothing to prevent the equality 
of U, and U„, there certainly is nothing in their analysis that 
guarantees it either. Hence, we question the validity of the Cicchetti 
and Freeman framework and view their conclusion that option value is 
greater than zero as being suspect. As Henry [1974, p. 90] noted: "It 
appears that their (Cicchetti and Freeman's) result depends crucially 
on the very particular way in which they 'make their utilities 
commensurable' " In fact, intuitively, it makes little sense that 
outcomes 5 and 8 yield the same utility. UV is the "free rider" outcome 
described above, whereas U 0 derives from the consumer not purchasing the 
o 
option, not demanding the good, and not having it supplied. For the 
utilities of these two outcomes (U5 and Ug) to be equal is as illogical 
as Byerlee's conclusion that not purchasing an option, and later 
demanding the good and not having it supplied, entails no loss in 
utility. 
Despite these problems, there were some other points made by 
Cicchetti and Freeman that should be noted. First of all, they did deal 
explicitly with the question of supply uncertainty, although not in a 
detailed manner in the short article. They asserted that supply 
uncertainty, even once the option is purchased, will reduce the option 
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price, but as long as the probability of supply is greater than that of 
no supply, option value will still be positive. 
Second, Cicchetti and Freeman's [1971, p. 539] conclusions led 
them to believe that uncertainty of demand can cause significant 
distortion of the allocative process in public investments. "Thus, 
where there is a large number of low probability demanders, omission of 
the option value benefit and a consideration only of the consumer 
surplus of the expected number of users would result in a significant 
understatement of benefits." 
The Cicchetti-Freeman analysis is also useful for illustrating the 
importance of the assumption of risk aversion to the existence of option 
value. Risk aversion implies a diminishing marginal utility of income. 
Hence, the utility function, U f(y), is concave from below. Concavity 
of the utility function is a sufficient condition for option value to 
be positive in the Cicchetti-Freeman model. That is, the maximum option 
price will exceed the expected value of consumer's surplus if the 
individual acts in a risk averse manner. On the other hand, if the 
individual is risk neutral (utility function is linear), option value 
is equal to zero. Finally, if the individual is a risk seeker or 
gambler, the maximum option price is less than the expected value of 
consumer's surplus and option value is negative. 
We can summarize the conclusions reached by Byerlee and Cicchetti 
and Freeman based on their respective analyses. Some of their 
conclusions are consistent. For example, both agree that option value 
is zero under conditions of demand certainty and when the seller charges 
the perfectly discriminating price to all consumers who decide to 
purchase the good. They also agree that option value is zero 
(negative) if consumers are risk neutral (seekers). The major differ-
ences between the two approaches is that Cicchetti and Freeman believe 
option value is always positive when individuals are risk averse and 
face uncertainty of future demand. Byerlee's analysis indicates that 
option value may be | 0 under these same conditions. The sign and 
magnitude of option value depend upon the shape of the individual's 
indifference curves and the degree of risk aversion. But we can add 
risk aversion to the list of necessary conditions required for option 
value to be other than zero. 
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Both of the articles explain and clarify the nature of option value 
and its relationship to consumer's surplus. However, we believe that 
both analyses contain flaws that prevent general acceptance of either 
set of conclusions. These flaws are at least partially due to the 
methodological framework used in the respective analyses. Both frame-
works lack an acceptable technique to describe and/or equate the 
utility levels associated with the alternatives of purchasing and not 
purchasing an option. 
Two major challenges to the Cicchetti and Freeman article have 
been presented. Schmalensee [1972] challenged the conclusion that 
option value is always positive; Arrow and Lind [1970] on the other 
hand, questioned the validity of the assumption of risk aversion when 
estimating project benefits from a social viewpoint. We will consider 
each of these below. 
Schmalensee Challenge 
Schmalensee adopted a state-preference framework of analysis that 
included the following elements: 
N--possible states or situations that may occur in the future 
TT.--known probability of state i occurring 
P--a state in which price of commodity X is so high that it is 
generally not available 
p*—a state in which price of commodity X is such that it is 
generally available 
S.--consumer surplus for state i if P* prevails instead of P 
0P--option price individuals would be willing to pay to assure that 
P* prevails (in all states) in the future 
Y.--conditional incomes in state i 
i 
^--utility associated with state i and income Y^ 
Uy--marginal utility of income in state i 
Given this model, option value is defined as 
0V - OP E n ^ 
Schmalensee posited some basic conditions regarding risk aversion 
in this model by assuming that the individual will accept neither fair 
nor unfair bets; instead, the consumer will only accept gambles that 
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are biased in his favor. From this he concluded that a sufficient 
condition for the individual to be risk averse at some point 
([Y.], P) is ([Y.] refers to a vector of possible future incomes): 
Uy ( V p ) = uy <Yj'P) 
That is, the individual is risk averse at the stated point only if 
the marginal utilities of all future incomes are equal at that point. 
This statement serves to relate the conditional utility functions to 
each other. 
Schmalensee illustrated that option value may be positive or 
negative using both equivalent and compensating measures of consumer 
surplus; below, we develop the argument for only the equivalent 
variation measure. The equivalent variation consumer's surplus (SE.) 
is the amount the individual would have to be compensated to be 
indifferent between P and P* in state i. More formally for a given sta 
i: 
U1 (Y..P*) U1 (Y. + SE..P) (i = 1....N) (7) 
Equivalent option price (OPE) can be defined as the amount of income 
that would have to be given to the consumer in every state in order to 
make him indifferent between P and P*. 
N , N 
I ..y(Yn.,P*) Z 7,-U1 (Y, + OPE, P) (8) 
i = 1 1 n i = 1 n 1 
and equivalent option value (OVE) is: 
N 
OVE = OPE Z ir.SE. (9) 
i 1 1 1 
With these definitions, Schmalensee shows that OVE is non-positive 
when the individual is risk averse at the state (Y. + OPE, P) if the 
equivalent variations (SE.) are not the same for all states. If they 
are the same for all states, then OVE 0: i.e., 
N , N 
Z T, Un(Y + SE..P) Z Tr.U1 (Y, + OPE.P) (10) 
1 = 1 1 n 1 i = 1 n 7 
Given the more realistic assumption that the SE. are not the same for 
all states and the utility functions are concave, Schmalensee construct 
the following inequality: 
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(11) 
This inequality is graphically illustrated in Figure 2. MU, is 
the marginal utility of income at (Y. + OPE.P). For the individual to 
be risk averse by Schmalensee's definition, ML), must be the marginal 
utility at all levels of income; hence we can project MU. back to the 
point (Y1 + SE. ,P) and see that Ufl ^ Up, where U„ and UQ represent the 
left hand and right hand side of inequality (11), respectively. The 
same result is obtained if SE. is greater than OPE. That is, UF J U_. 
Substituting (11) into (10) yields: 
U-f(Y) 
B 
Figure 2. Case Where Equivalent Option Value is Non-Positive 
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Substituting (10) into (12) and substracting like terms from each side 
yields: 
0 * Z ir.U^  (Y. + OPE.P) (SE. OPE.P) (13) 
Since iP (Yi OPE.P) is constant for all i because of the definition 
of risk aversion: 
N , , 
I ir- SE. OPE > 0 \U> 
i = 1 1 n 
Therefore, the equivalent option value (OVE) must be non-positive in the 
case where the individual is risk averse at (Y + OPE.P). 
The same approach is used to demonstrate that the equivalent option 
value is non-negative when the individual is risk averse at income level 
(Y. + SE..P). See Figure 3. Algebraically, the result is obtained in 
the same manner as above: 
(Y. + SE..P) (16) 
0 I I T^ .UJ (Y. + SE^P) (SEi OPE) (17) 
E „i SEi OPE < 0 (18) 
Therefore, OVE must be non-negative when the individual is risk averse 
at (Yi + S E ^ P ) . 
Schmalensee [1972, pp. 816-817] shows that similar results are 
obtained if compensating measures of option price, option value, and 
consumer surplus are used. He concludes that the sign of option value 
is indeterminate because it depends on the level of income at which the 
individual is risk averse. The implication of this conclusion is that 
the relative social risk of development versus preservation is 
indeterminate. Hence, Schmalensee's conclusions are consistent with our 
earlier observation that option value can exist for project outputs as 
well as preserved environments. The sign of option value associated 
with preservation depends on the relative riskiness of preservation 
versus the riskiness of development. 
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Figure 3. Case Where Equivalent Option Value is Non-Negative 
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Since the sign of option value is indeterminate, Schmalensee 
[1972, p. 823] advocates the use of expected consumer's surplus as the 
appropriate measure of future benefits: 
"... the expected value of consumers' surpluses ought to be 
employed as the best available approximation to the sum of their 
option prices, and this approximate total should be discounted at 
the riskless rate of interest. Benefits will be sometimes under-
estimated and sometimes over-estimated with this procedure, but 
there would appear to be no practical way to obtain superior 
results." 
Oddly enough, the only response to Schmalensee's article was a 
comment by Bohm [1975] which clarified and generalized Schmalensee's 
work. Bohm agreed wholeheartedly that option value may be positive, 
negative or zero, and neither Schmalensee nor Bohm require the reader 
to make a dramatic leap of faith such as that necessary in the 
Cicchetti and Freeman rule to make alternative utility mappings 
commensurable. 
Schmalensee and Bohm do, however, disagree over the practical 
application of the theory of option value. Schmalensee, as we noted, 
believed that expected consumer surplus should be used in benefit/cost 
calculations, while Bohm [1975, p. 736] says that, because we do not 
know the probabilities associated with future preference states for each 
consumer, that expected consumer surplus cannot be determined. "The 
option price is, therefore, the only measure of the benefit side of the 
investment that can conceivably be determined -- by sales of access 
rights, by interviews, by government "introspection," or other imperfect 
approaches." 
The question arises, given a world of ideal institutions, yet a 
continued lack of clairvoyance of the future, which of these two measures 
would we like to obtain to measure the future benefits of a resource. 
Clearly option price is the superior measure of benefits in the abstract, 
as long as we are unable to completely eliminate both supply and demand 
uncertainty and we accept the assumption of risk aversion. Expected 
consumer surplus will, as Schmalensee pointed out, tend to either 
over-estimate or under-estimate benefits. 
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The Nature of Risk Aversion: The Arrow and Lind Contribution 
The option value identified by Byerlee, Cicchetti and Freeman, and 
Schmalensee is a risk aversion premium. However, it is not clear that 
this is an appropriate assumption in the evaluation of major public 
investment projects from a social perspective. Arrow and Lind [1970] 
showed that the costs of risk bearing are near zero when they are 
spread over a large number of people as in the case with a public 
investment project. Thus, although individuals may be seen as risk 
averse in this context, society in the aggregate may be viewed as risk 
neutral. 
The conclusions of Arrow and Lind led Resources for the Future 
staff members to question the applicability of the Cicchetti and 
Freeman framework. For example, Fisher and Peterson [1976, p. 7] said, 
"The Cicchetti-Freeman analysis needs to be qualified ... Without a 
risk premium, we have lost our difference between option value and 
consumers' surplus." Schmalensee [1972, p. 823] on the other hand, 
argued that the Arrow and Lind conclusion does not undermine his 
assumptions of risk aversion for public investment projects where 
benefit/cost analysis would normally be employed. This is because, 
"... benefits from government investments typically accrue mainly to 
a fraction of society, and risk-spreading arguments have little force 
in such cases." The nature of risk as it relates to public investment 
remains a moot point. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Remains of Option Value 
What can we conclude from the body of literature discussed above? 
Initially, Weisbrod hypothesized that option value may exist for all 
goods and that a positive increment of benefits must be added to 
expected consumer's surplus to account for those people who value the 
option to use the resource or product in the future. Cicchetti and 
Freeman presented a framework to substantiate Weisbrod's hypothesis 
that option value is always positive. However, we believe their 
analysis is flawed and, therefore, their conclusions are unwarranted. 
Schmalensee and Bohm, on the other hand, provide a convincing argument 
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that option value may be positive, negative or equal to zero even though 
the two writers disagree on the practical conclusions for measuring 
social benefits. Schmalensee favors the measurement of expected 
consumer's surplus as a proxy for social benefits whereas Bohm favors 
measurement and use of option price. We believe that option price is 
the best measure of benefits for an individual in society. However, 
we agree with Schmalensee that we are better able to measure expected 
consumer's surplus than option price. 
Option value is inevitably related to the problem of market 
allocation of collective goods. In many instances this problem is due 
to institutions rather than the nature of the commodity. Simply stated, 
society is not willing to accept methods that exclude some people from 
use of collective goods. For example, the use of many national and 
state parks could be limited to those possessing options which had to 
be purchased in advance. The sale of these options by the government 
and allowing their subsequent market transfer would better indicate the 
value individuals place upon the right to use these resources in the 
future. The only barrier that exists to the measurement of the option 
price of such outdoor recreational experiences is an institutional one. 
Clearly we have little reason to desire that the government act as a 
price discriminating monopolist in the allocation of outdoor recreation-
al resources. But many such goods that presumably have an option value 
in excess of consumer surplus could be evaluated in this way if it were 
considered socially desirable. 
Even if society was willing to accept methods that would allow the 
measurement of option price, the Arrow and Lind analysis suggests that 
the resulting values would not be appropriate for use in benefit/cost 
calculations. Option value is a premium that assumes individuals are 
risk averse. Arrow and Lind show that risk is inversely related to the 
number of people who enjoy the benefits and who pay the costs. Since 
costs and benefits are often spread over many people in society the 
risk encountered by any one individual is very small. The total risk 
to society also decreases as risks are spread over more people. Thus, 
Arrow and Lind argue that society should assume a risk neutral posture 
in estimating social benefits and costs. This eliminates the risk 
aversion condition required for option value to be non-zero. However, 
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Schmalensee argues that the benefits of public investments are often 
localized and thus these risk-spreading arguments are not relevant. 
Thus, it appears we are faced with a dilemma. On one hand, option 
price seems to be the theoretically superior measure of benefits for an 
individual in society who exhibits risk-averse behavior. On the other 
hand, risk aversion may not be an appropriate assumption when 
calculating social benefits. Furthermore, we are pessimistic about our 
ability to effectively determine the sign and magnitude of option value 
even if option value was an appropriate measure to include in benefit/ 
cost studies. Therefore, we are inclined to conclude that adjustments 
for option value are not possible and/or warranted in the calculation 
of social benefits and costs. 
Beyond Pure Option Value 
If the demise of pure option value in benefit/cost studies has not 
yet been publicly acknowledged, there is tacit recognition of this fact 
in the development of the concept of "quasi-option value." Arrow and 
Fisher [1974], Fisher and Krutilla [1974], and Henry [1974] all pointed 
out that when a development of a natural resource entails irreversibil-
ities and/or information from the present period will lead to a better 
understanding of the costs and benefits of future development the, "... 
net benefits from developing the area are reduced and, broadly speaking, 
less of the area should be developed" [Arrow and Fisher 1974, p. 314]. 
As Fisher and Krutilla [1974, p. 97] said a "... conservative policy 
toward development is indicated in such a circumstance." Hence, the 
irreversible nature of some decisions and the potential for improved 
information for making these decisions in the future are sufficient for 
the existence of quasi-option value. 
Irreversibility, with the exception of the loss of species, is a 
relative concept and is a function of time and price. There is a 
threshold of cost and time beyond which we consider the action to be 
irreversible, even though in strictest terms the action is reversible. 
Thus, the destruction of a redwood forest is different from the 
destruction of the last redwood seed. But we consider the forest's 
destruction as irreversible for all practical purposes. This extreme 
case is easy to agree upon on practical grounds. There are certainly 
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less extreme cases in which the distinction between reversible and 
irreversible actions is less clear to all. 
A detailed discussion of quasi-option value will not be presented 
here. However, it is clearly related to the option value identified 
by Weisbrod. For example, weisbrod's condition that the prohibitively 
high cost of reinitiating production of a good or resource once it has 
been stopped can be construed to be equivalent to an irreversible action. 
Furthermore, it would seem that uniqueness of the good or resource will 
have an important influence on both option value and quasi-option value. 
However, we believe that the term "quasi-option value' has created some 
confusion concerning its relationship to option value. We agree with 
Henry [1974, p. 90] who suggests that the value associated with 
irreversible decisions should be labeled the "irreversibility effect" 
rather than quasi-option value. 
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